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ESSAY 
SELECTING LAW CLERKS 
Patricia M. Wald* 
I. "APRIL Is THE CRUELLEST MONTH" 
April may indeed have been "the cruellest month" 1 this year for 
federal judges and their prospective clerks. For a decade now, federal 
judges have been trying - largely without success - to conduct a 
dignified, collegial, efficient law clerk selection process. Because each 
federal judge has only to choose two to three clerks each year, and 
there is a large universe of qualified applicants graduating each year 
from our law schools, this would not seem an insurmountable task. 
And because each federal judge has choice first-year positions to offer 
and has no need or ability to dicker on salary or hours or perks, one 
would expect the process to go quickly and smoothly. Not so. To the 
contrary, the yearly clerk caper has been variously described as a 
"frenzied mating ritual, "2 "madcap decisionmaking, "3 "positively sur-
real, the most ludicrous thing I've even been through . . . brilliant, 
respected people ... behaving like 6-year olds"4 and a "process ... in 
which the law of the jungle reigns and badmouthing, spying and even 
poaching among judges is rife."5 
This state of affairs is ironic. In the circuit courts of appeal, for 
example, it is not unusual for a judge to receive 300-400 clerk applica-
tions, most from top-drawer candidates. Why then the intense compe-
tition among judges, the unreasonable short-fuse deadlines for 
acceptance, the covert maneuvering by judges and applicants, and the 
judiciary's frustrating inability to devise an orderly process that com-
ports with the seriousness of the job and the dignity of the relationship 
between judge and clerk? 
After eleven years as a judge and a participant in numerous unsuc-
cessful efforts at reform, let me suggest a few reasons for the highly 
• Chief Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
1. T.S. ELIOT, The Waste Land, in THE WASTE LAND AND OTHER POEMS 25, 27 (1971). 
2. Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race far Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
17, 1989, at B4, col. 1. 
3. Internal correspondence. 
4. Margolick, supra note 2 (quoting a Stanford student). 
S. Id. 
152 
October 1990] Selecting Law Clerks 153 
charged atmosphere in which clerk searches are conducted. The 
judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually dependent 
one I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair. Unlike 
lawyers in law firms or government bureaucracies, the federal judge (I 
speak now primarily of an appellate judge) works in small, isolated 
chambers with a minimum of work contacts outside. She is totally 
dependent on herself, her law clerks, and her staff, for an output of 
forty or more published opinions a year and dozens of unpublished, 
nonprecedent-setting opinions. Although she may talk to and confer 
with other judges and sometimes their clerks in the opinion-writing 
process, her work will basically reflect the efforts of her own cham-
bers. If for any reason one of her clerks proves significantly deficient, 
she, or the other clerks, must take up the slack; she cannot tum to 
other chambers or other court personnel. Although, as our legal jour-
nals chronicle, judges on occasion have fired law clerks during the 
year, it is a rare occurrence devoutly to be avoided. As a rule, judges 
live with their misjudgments. But an excellent versus a mediocre team 
of clerks makes a huge difference in the judge's daily life and in her 
work product. Indeed, a judge sometimes decides whether to file a 
separate opinion or to dissent in a case based - at least in part -
upon the support she can anticipate from her clerks. Or she may ask 
for, or beg off, responsibility for a particular opinion assignment be-
cause of the availability or nonavailability of a particular clerk to work 
on the case. Judges talk about it being a "good" or "bad" year, not 
just in terms of results they have achieved, or in the importance of 
matters before the court, but also in terms of teamwork and the dy-
namics of work within their chambers. Her clerks are basically the 
only persons a judge can talk to in depth about a case. Her colleagues 
have their own opinions to write; after the initial post-argument case 
conference, there is usually little time for extended discussions about 
fine points of an opinion they are not writing. The judge to whom the 
opinion is assigned is expected to produce a draft for her colleagues to 
critique. If she is in doubt, troubled, or just plain frustrated, the clerk 
is her wailing wall. Most of us are not Holmes or Cardozo; we are 
often unsure of our analyses or even our conclusions. We need to test 
ideas before exposing them to the hard probing of colleagues. We 
need assurances, but even more important, criticism from knowledge-
able persons who are loyal and unambiguously committed to us. We 
have, on occasion, to let our guard down, to speculate, to experiment, 
to argue, even to make frank and sometimes uncharitable appraisals of 
our colleagues' drafts and suggestions. Despite trendy criticism of un-
due law clerk influence over judges, my view is that our jurisprudence 
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is better for the give and take among judges and law clerks than if 
judges had to go it alone. 
Different judges use clerks differently, some only to exchange 
ideas, or to check footnotes, or to research records, others, after dis-
cussion, to draft opinions. I am not sure that one method is better or 
truer to the ideal of a good judge than the other. The aim in the opin-
ion-writing effort is to produce a cogent, coherent rationale for a ma-
jority or a dissenting opinion, and to accommodate that rationale to 
existing law, or even, on appropriate occasions, to move existing law 
forward. If the clerks' efforts advance that goal and are acceptable to 
the responsible judge, I do not see what difference it makes as to whose 
words are whose in the opinion. Given the size of records and the 
inexorable increase in caseloads, precious few of us can perform with-
out staff support. 
So, in the final analysis, although federal judges' income lags by 
comparison with their private peers, they have few perks, no chauf-
feurs or limousines, and minimal expense accounts, they do have ac-
cess to the "best and brightest" helpers - albeit for only a year at a 
time. That is why good clerks are so valuable, and why many judges 
find them worth "going to war" for. 
But why the fervent competition for a handful of young men and 
women when our law schools spawn hundreds of fine young lawyers 
every year? Very simply, many judges are not looking just for quali-
fied clerks; they yearn for neophytes who can write like Learned 
Hand, hold their own in a discussion with great scholars, possess a 
preternatural maturity in judgment and instinct, are ferrets in re-
search, will consistently outperform their peers in other chambers and 
who all the while will maintain a respectful, stoic, and cheerful 
demeanor. 
And, candidly, there is another factor in the calculus of many ap-
pellate judges who lead the annual chase. A judge's reputation among 
his own colleagues may in part reflect his ability to garner the most 
highly-credentialed clerks under his banner so that he can maintain a 
reputation as a "feeder" of clerks to the Supreme Court. Correla-
tively, the stronger an appellate (or a district) judge's reputation for 
channeling clerks to the high court, the more attractive he will be to 
many understandably ambitious, qualified clerk applicants. Some 
judges have long friendships with justices so that their clerks have an 
edge simply by virtue of that relationship. Others become feeders be-
cause they consistently are able to recruit the law review editors and 
top students from prestigious schools; not surprisingly, they want to 
keep it that way. Thus, in any year, out of the 400 clerk applications a 
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judge may receive, a few dozen will become the focus of the competi-
tion; these few will be aggressively courted by judges from coast to 
coast. Early identification of these "precious few" is sought and re-
ceived from old-time friends in the law schools - usually before the 
interview season even begins. 
Why is the race so much more frenzied for positions within the 
federal courts than at pricey law firms or in choice government agen-
cies, or even in the Supreme Court, which manages to hire its clerks 
each year with decorum and no evidence of unseemly competition? 
Generally, firms and government agencies are hiring a number of new 
associates or staff attorneys; a misjudgment as to any one is not terri-
bly costly. And because the Supreme Court has only thirty-seven 
clerkships in all, there are top applicants to accommodate every justice 
without jostling. I have never heard of an applicant turning down a 
justice's offer or even calling another justice for a counteroffer. Each 
spot has equal prestige - no comparative shopping is necessary; there 
is no higher clerkship to feed into. 
In their less-harried moments, lower court judges realize that there 
is plenty of talent out there and that the way we pick clerks now is not 
a sure indicator of their performance. One of our ablest federal appel-
late judges commented during the most recent selection process that 
"top grades don't necessarily predict who will end up doing the best 
job, and the professors don't know either." He is right, and I would 
add that the best performing appellate clerks are not always the ones 
who go on to the Supreme Court. However, the myth of the superstar 
clerk lives on, and like the pied piper continues to lure pursuing 
judges. 
II. FAILED EFFORTS To REIGN THE BEAST 
Until the last decade, it seemed that federal appellate judges were 
content to recruit clerks at an easy pace. There were fewer judges, and 
fewer clerkships; judges had one, later two clerks; judges' caseloads 
were lighter, their dependence on clerks less critical. Because of the 
small numbers, a clerkship, though always a valuable career asset, was 
not considered as crucial to certain careers in the law, like teaching, as 
it apparently is now. I was hired in 1951 as a clerk to Second Circuit 
Judge Jerome Frank in May of my third year on the recommendation 
of a law school professor who knew us both. No formal letter of appli-
cation was made, no heavy appendix of sample work attached. The 
interview, if such it was, was conducted in the hallway of the law 
school where Judge Frank taught a weekly seminar. A few judges still 
do it that way or commandeer faculty friends or panels of their ex-
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clerks to pick out the new clerks. But the majority of judges I know 
do otherwise: they meticulously weed out applications according to 
grades, law review positions, faculty recommendations, writing sam-
ples, winnowing the list down to a week or so of interviews (anywhere 
from five to fifty); they then make offers, and reoffers if the first choices 
do not accept. 
In an open market, where there is no prior agreement on when the 
selection process may begin or end, the preemptive striker sets the 
time frame for those judges who want to compete. Over three decades, 
the selection time has crept forward from late in a student's third year 
to midway in his second year. Early-bird judges skim off those appli-
cants with the brightest credentials. This clearly bothers not only 
other judges but the top clerk candidates themselves who have their 
own preference about whom they wish to clerk for. So upon receiving 
an early offer from a less-favored judge, the candidate may call his first 
choice, apprise her of the offer, and solicit a counteroffer. And the 
race is on. Clerk candidates, by the way, are not themselves without 
guile; they learn quickly to hedge, to answer some calls earlier than 
others, to avoid some calls altogether, and to solicit time in which to 
seek competing offers. Judges, in turn, sometimes are unseemly in 
their pursuit. They make "short-fuse" offers that lapse if the clerk 
does not respond within a specified time. Without any agreed upon 
guidelines among judges, the process over the years has peaked earlier 
and earlier and become ever more frenzied. 
For almost a decade now, judges have complained that the clerk-
ship selection process is undignified, even demeaning. Law school 
deans and faculties have echoed the lament: students' concentration 
on studies is disrupted mid-term; faculties are thrown into internal 
competition and forced to make evaluations on inadequate academic 
records. Since the early 1980s there have been sporadic attempts to 
establish ground rules. The Judicial Conference of the United States 
established an ad hoc committee in 1982 that recommended a schedule 
for beginning interviews in September of the candidates' third year but 
set no fixed, enforceable time within which to make offers. Many 
judges abided by the recommended guideline but a substantial number 
did not. Because of the consequent tensions, the effort was abandoned. 
In successive years, judges in several circuits agreed to deadlines on 
offers in April or July, but again, many judges were unwilling to ac-
cept these constraints. 
Throughout the eighties there were, alternatively, open-season 
years (judges were free to make an offer at any time) and years in 
which many (but not all) judges in many (but not all) circuits agreed 
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to hold to a specified deadline. Skepticism and cynicism about the 
effectiveness of these efforts grew. Newly appointed Judges expressed 
dismay at how ruthlessly the process worked. Veterans said they were 
disinclined to join yet another voluntary compact. 
During this time the role of the law schools came under fire as 
well. "Back-channel" efforts to place favored students were sc01;ed, as 
was the failure of law schools to encourage students to hold to volun-
tary deadlines. Proposals were made - and rejected - that judges 
themselves condition their consideration of applications on a student's 
pledge not to consider an offer before an agreed-upon date. 
Attempts to enlist the support of the Supreme Court in halting the 
rush have been unavailing. Not experiencing the same pressures itself, 
the Court remains aloof; apparently, the justices consider it a problem 
that lower court judges must resolve for themselves. 
In 1989, after a particularly scathing article in the New York Times 
comparing federal judges to "sheiks looking for luxury cars," sprin-
kled with references to the annual "mad dash" for clerks, and "judi-
cial decorum left in the dust,"6 a group of judges, including several 
circuit chiefs, undertook a campaign to have the Judicial Councils, the 
governing bodies for the circuits, adopt deadlines for clerkship offers. 
Recognizing that it was unlikely such a directive cqµld be enforced 
against an errant judge, it was still hoped that a polity directive from 
the Councils would carry more weight than an info~al agreement of 
judges. In the spring of 1989, the District of Columbia Judicial Coun-
cil passed the following Resolution: 
Commencing in 1990, the D.C. Circuit Council is committed to the 
practice that no job offers, tentative or final, shall be made to law clerk 
applicants before May 1st of the applicant's second year. 
In some Circuits, the Resolution talked in terms of the "sense" of the 
Council; in one, it was reported that a substantial number of judges 
was willing to go along but "two or three stridently independent types 
are indulging in forensic displays of Article III independence." One 
dubious circuit judge called the proposal a "shot in the dark" and sug-
gested that sometimes doing nothing was the best alternative available. 
A second complained that smart applicants could confound the sys-
tem: "A judge is not going to know how many people to call on May 
1st." A third prophesied that the plan would fail because there would 
always be noncompliance. 
In the end, the D.C., Federal, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Eighth, Tenth, and a majority of judges on the Ninth adopted some 
6. Id. 
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form of limiting resolution. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh de-
clined. There were two variations in the resolutions: some, but not 
all, contained a provision that the offers remain open for twenty-four 
hours; some made compliance with the May 1st deadline contingent 
upon the concurrence of all other circuits; some agreed unilaterally. 
Following the adoption of the resolutions, notices were sent out to 
all major law schools. The Association of American Law Schools, in 
turn, urged its faculty members to withhold letters of endorsement 
until April 1 so that interviewing would be limited to the one month 
before May 1. The scheme, however, did not (and could not) prohibit 
students from contacting judges, and so the flood of requests for inter-
views actually began in late February and early March to coincide 
with law schools' spring breaks. On the notion that applicants paying 
their own travel fares should not have to make repeat visits, most 
judges began the interviewing process in early to mid-March; the law 
schools fell in line and in many circuits the interviews were largely 
over by April 1. 
There were some early defections among judges in March, but a 
relative few. Many of the restive judges of earlier years stayed the 
course in 1990. But there was predictable unhappiness with those cir-
cuits that had not adopted resolutions, where judges had the field to 
themselves. In some cases, complying judges rationalized that, in 
meeting the offer of a noncomplying judge, they were not violating the 
agreement. In early April, one of the major circuits withdrew, its 
judges lamenting that "most large cartels break down" and suggesting 
that it may be necessary "simply to let chaos reign." And a committee 
of complying judges in one circuit declared that it was "within the 
spirit of the rule" for judges' law clerks to contact students on their 
judges' "short lists" to indicate continuing interest and to give the stu-
dents an opportunity to prioritize their choices. After such notifica-
tion, it would be fair to expect that students would act promptly when 
a firm offer was made. 
As Mayday approached, complying judges grew increasingly anx-
ious; efforts to get agreement on a twenty-four-hour waiting period for 
acceptances failed. One judge pleaded for at least a short period to 
allow students to make a phone call or two before committing them-
selves to a particular clerkship. "They will learn," he said, "that it 
makes little difference in the long run which clerkship they choose." 
By consensus, a one-hour waiting period was fixed. 
Savvy clerk applicants meanwhile played their own hands. They 
(or sometimes their sponsoring professors) called chambers in advance 
to announce that that particular judge was the first choice. This news 
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permitted the judge confidently to make the applicant an offer ifhe did 
it promptly at 12:00 EST (the agreed-upon hour for opening offers); if 
he waited, however, he was likely to receive a call that the applicant 
had another offer and could only hold out for a few minutes. So, with-
out violating the agreement and making an offer ahead of time, the 
judge had only limited control. One venerable judge refused to enter 
the May 1 roundup, which he compared to "buying a yearling at an 
auction." 
What actually happened on May 1? A few judges weakened at the · 
end and made calls ahead of the deadline. This, in turn, provoked the 
students to call other judges they preferred before the noon deadline, 
so there was a destabilizing flurry of predeadline transactions. But the 
major complaint was the frenzy with which offers had to be made and 
accepted. Those judges who gave their choices time to reflect found 
themselves severely disadvantaged. The one-hour window collapsed 
as applicants felt constrained to accept the first offer tendered. A 
judge who did not get through to an applicant at 12:00 noon was often 
too late. "I got my first choice," one judge complained, "and, after 
that, having given the applicant a half hour, I found my next 8 or 9 
choices gone." By 12:15 virtually all of the bidding in the D.C. Circuit 
was over. Between 12:00 and 12:15, judges were making offers on one 
line as calls came in on a second from frantic applicants trying to learn 
if they were to get an offer before they responded to the offer of an-
other judge. 
Afterwards, a few judges said they thought that postponing the 
selection date to May 1 was a gain; some also said the interviewing 
process had been more pleasurable and comprehensive since it was not 
conducted under the threat of preemptive offers by other judges. A 
number of applicants commented favorably that they got to meet and 
interview more judges than they might have in other years. 
But overwhelmingly, the critics seemed to prevail.7 Judges com-
monly complained that because all offers were postponed until May 
first and interviewing began in March, they interviewed more candi-
dates than they wanted since they could not be sure their first choices 
would accept. From their point of view, the time would have been 
better spent on the work of the court. And several applicants com-
plained about the increased cost of interviewing with numerous 
judges. Given the intense competition for clerkships, most applicants 
7. A questionnaire is presently being circulated among federal judges to ascertain more pre-
cisely their reactions to last year's experiment. 
160 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:152 
felt compelled to interview with many judges; under the old system, an 
early offer could save the applicant much of this expense. 
Leaders of this year's efforts recognize that it will not likely be 
repeated. Some judges who complied have already declared that they 
will not do so again. There appear to be three basic options for 
change. The first is a return to "complete deregulation." Let those 
who wish to compete do so on their own terms, however early they 
begin the process or however arbitrarily they act during it. One critic 
of this year's experiment points out that judges who are prone to act 
entirely at their own discretion will do so no matter what the rules are. 
Thus - the deregulators say - the best way is to let judges do what 
they want, even if it does not always look decorous to the public. 
There is considerable support for this position. 
A second option is more regulation: set a definite but shortened 
time for interviews immediately preceding the offer deadline, perhaps 
April 1-30, and require that the offer remain open for a fixed period, 
perhaps one to two hours. But adherents concede that it will not work 
unless it can be enforced, and no such control over fiercely indepen-
dent judges presently exists. A simpler variation has been suggested 
and appears to have the greatest support: all circuits agree not to in-
terview until a certain date, preferably in the fall of the students' third 
year; once irlterviews begin, offers can be made at any time. Some 
West Coast judges, not unreasonably, balk on the ground that it would 
give East Coast judges a natural advantage; offers will be made to the 
most desirable East Coast candidates before they embark on expensive 
interviewing trips West. 
III. Is THERE A DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE? 
For the past several years, and especially in the months since May 
1, judges have talked reverently, if often vaguely, about the "medical 
model" - a matching program that has been used for forty years to 
match up medical resident applicants with hospital residencies here 
and in Canada.8 In fact, a committee of the D.C. Circuit, headed by 
District Judge Louis Oberdorfer, is exploring the feasibility of such a 
system for law clerks. The committee has sought the advice of the 
Association of Americfill, Law Schools, and firms that design and im-
plement match systems in the medical profession. While recognizing a 
8. It has also been used in the Toronto-Vancouver Law Finn Matching Program which 
matches law school graduates to firms in those two cities where they must "article" for a year 
before becoming eligible for the bar. The program runs under the auspices of the Law Society of 
Upper Canada and the Vancouver Bar Association and processes 900 applicants for over 800 
positions with approximately 150 employers. 
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host of problems, the project participants are moderately optimistic 
about the feasibility of such a system for clerk selection. 
The basic algorithm for all matching programs is the same, 
although software must be customized to address the specific require-
ments of each program. The system works like this: applicants apply 
to any program they are interested in; interviews are conducted com-
pletely independently of the match. But no offers can be made during 
the specified interview time. By a predetermined date, each applicfil\t 
submits a Rank Order List of programs he or she would accept in 
order of priority; in the case of law clerks it would be a rank order of 
preferences among judges. The judges, in turn, submit similar lists of 
their "true preferences." In our case, the matching clearinghouse 
would then simulate the making of offers by juqges and the acceptance 
or rejection of these offers by applicants based on the information in 
the rank sheets. Each judge would receive acceptances from her high-
est ranked applicants who have not already received offers from judges 
that the applicants prefer. A match between an applicant and a judge 
would constitute a binding commitment. Following the match, infor-
mation on positions that remain available would be provided to appli-
cants who had not been matched to a position; correlatively, 
information on unmatched applicants would be provided to judges 
with unfilled positions. They could then contact and negotiate with 
each other at will. All ranking information would be kept 
confidential. 
Selecting law clerks poses special problems to the· application of a 
matching system. First to mind is the need for flexibility to accommo-
date most judges' personal desires for diversity among their clerks. 
Thus, assuming a judge has a clear first preference, she may not have a 
clear number two or number three choice regardless of whether 
number one accepts. Rather, she may be thinking in terms of a blend 
of law schools, gender, race, ethnicity, backgrounds. If she gets her 
number one choice, she may know who she wants for number two. If 
she gets number two as well, she may have number three picked. But 
if she misses on number one, her number two may be altogether differ-
ent, and even if she gets number one but not number two, her next 
choice for number two and for number three may vary. Thus the 
ranking of "true preferences" may work for the student applicant but 
not for the judge. 
In fact, this problem surfaces in medical matches as well. ·Without 
getting into the complexities, other programs have found that it is pos-
sible to structure the simulated match to accommodate attempts to 
recruit a particular distribution based on specific applicant characteris-
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tics. The prospective employer can divide positions into separate cate-
gories and submit ranking orders for each type. Thus contingent 
rank-ordered preferences would allow judges to submit a different set 
of preferences if their first (or second) choices are not available.9 
Whether, however, the subtle factors that enter into a judge's choices 
of three clerks can be objectivized sufficiently in advance to be suscep-
tible to simulated choices will remain unknown until a proposed work-
ing model is exposed for comment. 
One aspect of matching systems - strict confidentiality - could 
be attractive to the judiciary. The matchmaker would not disclose 
either the judge's or applicant's rank preferences and mutual promises 
of "I'll pick you first if you pick me first" would not be enforced. This 
confidentiality would protect judges from what they often consider the 
embarrassment of having their known first choices prefer other judges. 
If they did not disclose their choices voluntarily, they would not be 
known. There is no question that collegiality now suffers when a judge 
loses his first choice to another judge that the applicant chose or even 
solicited in preference to him. The match system is designed to mini-
mize such situations. Of course, it is naive to think that preferences 
will not be communicated even if not enforceable. And an applicant 
who leads one judge into thinking he is her first choice may well be 
quite reluctant to rouse that judge's pique in futuro by downgrading 
him on her preference list even if she is given assurances of confidenti-
ality. So even the computerized match may not entirely eliminate pre-
emptive strikes by some judges. But it would certainly soften the 
harshness of the Mayday market. 
More fundamentally, a judge may feel that a candidate's genuine 
desire to clerk for him is a valid element in the judge's own decision. 
A highly motivated clerk will often out-produce a less motivated one, 
and the relationship with a clerk who truly admires the judge can be 
more satisfying than with one who got only her second choice. There 
is no great attraction for a judge to list his first five "true preferences" 
without knowing whether there is any reciprocal preference. The 
judge could end up with the least of both worlds - clerks who were 
not his top choices and who did not choose him as theirs. 
The match system as presently practiced also means that partici-
pating parties are bound by the simulations. That may be too much to 
expect of article III judges who are notoriously independent critters. 10 
9. The National Matching Service reports that the Vancouver and Toronto programs have 
matched 73% of applicants and 76% of law firms to their first or second choices. 
10. And perhaps too much patience; after priority lists have been submitted by both sides, 
the results of a match typically take 2-1/2 weeks to announce. 
October 1990] Selecting Law Clerks 163 
Perhaps the biggest unknown is whether a match system can work 
if not all applicants and judges participate. It would not be surprising 
to encounter many "wait-and-sees" the first time around, particularly 
among judges. One estimate is that it would take participation by at 
least seventy percent of the judges on the most aggressive courts and at 
least the same percentage of candidates in the principal law schools to 
make a match system work. 
In existing matching programs, not all applicants or employers 
participate, but even the nonparticipants are bound _by some rules. 
Thus, in the Toronto-Vancouver apprenticeship match, nonparticipat-
ing firms may make offers to participants only up to the time that the 
participants submit their rank lists, and they must leave any existing 
offers to participating applicants open until that date. Students, in 
turn, may accept an offer only up to the date they submit their lists, 
not afterwards. If they have accepted an offer, they may not submit a 
list. It is not clear - indeed it is quite murky - whether nonpartici-
pating article III judges would agree to abide by any such rules, or 
even whether all participating students or judges would stick to them. 
In the past, a handful of independent judges have been unwilling to 
accept fixed selection dates. Those same judges may defeat a match 
system as well, unless other judges are willing to abide by a scheme 
that does not have 100% compliance, and hence risks losing a few 
superstar applicants. My own feeling is that the match system de-
serves at least a fair trial as a last hedge against the anarchic open 
market so many judges and law schools now deplore. But it is surely 
no panacea; it cannot eliminate all of the human variables that beset 
the present system. Maybe judges have to look harder into their own 
realities and perceptions to see if the gamesmanship at which a few 
excel is really worth the angst and perceptions of unseemly competi-
tion that now cloud the clerkship selection process. We shall see. 
